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Body Memory and the Unconscious
Thomas Fuchs

Introduction: psychoanalysis and phenomenology
Psychoanalysis and phenomenology, two theories that arose at more or less
the same time1, both considering themselves basic sciences of subjectivity,
have nevertheless remained foreign to one another. The grounds for this are
probably to be found primarily in their conflicting views of the role played
by consciousness. To psychoanalysis, consciousness appeared only as a
shimmering varnish concealing psychological forces and processes in unfathomable depths which are what is actually effective. For phenomenology, on the other hand, consciousness rather was the medium or the light
through which all phenomena come to be seen in the first place, and appear
as such. Consciousness as the sphere of mere semblance (Schein) or of
manifestation (Erscheinung) – is a pointed distinction that could be made
between the two.
Accordingly, they held contrasting views also of the unconscious: either it
was considered the actual source of the psyche's life, the hidden meaningful
structure and driving force, which made its way by various means, even in
opposition to the conscious intentions of the subject. Or the unconscious
had to be viewed as restricted to an implicit awareness that remained potentially accessible to consciousness or reflection, and, in any case, could not
basically be foreign to the subject. In Husserl's words:
"What I do not 'know', what in my experience, my imagining, thinking,
doing, is not present to me as perceived, remembered, thought, etc., will
not 'influence' my mind. And what is not in my experience, be it ignored
or implicitly-intentionally decided, does not motivate me even unconsciously" (Husserl 1952, 231).
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These two views seem hardly reconcilable. However, on closer analysis,
psychoanalysis and phenomenology do in fact have a common starting
point: it is in the Cartesian view of consciousness as "clear and distinct
perception", the assumption that consciousness is transparent to itself
insofar as its own contents are concerned. For Husserl, the "cogito" is the
present evidence, the necessary “appresentation” of all contents in the
observing consciousness, without which they would melt or escape into the
unreality of past or future. All memories, all ideas, all the possibilities of
consciousness, must cling, as it were, to this evident present so as not to
vanish.
But Freud's view of consciousness is not much different: conscious is only
"… the idea that is present in our consciousness and which we perceive" in
each case (Freud 1943, 29). Thus, consciousness is considered the space for
current ideas or representations. The unconscious is then the space
containing all the other ideas which are not present at a particular moment.
Freud rejects an ambiguous knowing-unknowing consciousness for "… a
consciousness of which one knows nothing seems to me many times more
absurd than a psychic unconscious" (Freud 1940b, 243). Consciousness
must be transparent to itself or it is not consciousness at all.
Psychoanalysis thus rebelled against the classical philosophy of consciousness, and not only failed to overcome it but, without being aware of it, even
adopted its premises. The situation is similar to that in today's conflict between neurobiology and classical philosophy: The sovereign, autonomous
conscious subject that neurobiology believes it must dethrone is itself
merely a dualistic construct. Separated from its body and its life, restricted
to present "mental states", the bodiless, and to this extent powerless, "ego"
becomes easy prey to neurobiological reductionism, and the role of the unconscious as the actually powerful substrate is now taken over by the material brain.
Now the dimension of embodiment of the subject was increasingly brought
to the fore by phenomenology as time went on, and it could just as easily
have become the core of psychoanalysis. Freud, as is well known, did not
only see the origin of the Ego in the body2. The body also played a decisive
role in psychoanalytical drive theory, since this theory assumed a step-by-
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step development of partial drives, which are dominated by certain regions
of the body, and whose "destinies" permanently affect the development of
the individual. Nevertheless, despite this concept, the dualism of body and
mind had a crucial impact also on psychoanalytic theory. For Freud, in the
final analysis, drives are not phenomena of the lived body, but objectivesomatic quantities; and their so-called representations do not belong to a
libidinous body of the subject but are already part of the psyche as an inner,
hidden apparatus where drive derivatives and drive energies are converted
into one another and distributed to various levels of the psyche – an
apparatus which can only be decoded on the basis of external signs such as
body-language or by way of speech. In the end, the body thus remained
interesting only as the seat of symbolic or imagined meanings, as a primary
projection field for the psyche, so to speak, which always had to be
scrutinized for its hidden meanings. That mental phenomena could at the
same time be bodily as well was not imaginable in the dualistic paradigm.
With the idea of the "psychic apparatus", which doubtlessly goes back to
Freud's own early brain theory, an entity had also been created that served
as a sort of inner container for images and memories of external reality.
Introjected as "object-representations", "imagos" etc., they populated the
various compartments of the psyche and developed a life of their own with
the help of the drive energies. In this way, the Ego remained separated from
important parts of these compartments through radical ignorance: the
topologically structured, dynamic unconscious, according to Freud, is basically different from the preconscious as the latent and implicitly known
(Freud 1940c, 77f.). Between the pre-conscious and the unconscious stands
the economical mechanism of repression, and both what is repressed and
the repressing mechanism – i.e. the motivation for repression – elude
consciousness. As evidence for this concept, Freud could point to bodily
symptoms or to Freudian slips, which appeared alien or meaningless to the
Ego, furthermore to the difference between manifest and latent dream
content which is attributable to an unconscious censor, and, last but not
least, to the resistance shown by the patient during analysis to becoming
aware of what has been repressed.
This radical separation of the unconscious, however, came at a high cost,
for now it had to be assigned to the objectivity of the psychological
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apparatus. Freud had discovered a paradox, namely that one "knows
something that one simultaneously does not know" and that "one is struck
with blindness while the eyes see" (Freud 1957, 175 note). He was only
able to solve this paradox by the splitting of the psyche into two parts. As a
consequence, the unconscious turns into an "internal foreign country",
(Freud 1940c, 62), in other words to something external within oneself,
whose meaning and effect are alien to the subject.
At this point, however, we should remember Husserl's objection to a
motivation which is entirely alien to the subject. Moreover, how should the
subject be in the position to re-appropriate such an alien meaning, unless it
was always his own meaning? Psychoanalytical therapy could then do no
more than convey rational insights into the mechanisms of one's foreign
inner life, and could not contribute to a genuine integration of one’s
personality. The classical aim of psychoanalysis: "where id was, ego shall
be", would then remain only a matter of explicit knowledge, not of actual
self-appropriation.
The phenomenological critique of this concept moved along various paths,
of which I will only mention two:
– Sartre saw the unconscious not as a circumstance imposing restrictions on the subject from outside, but as a basic modality of the
subject's relationship to himself, namely, that of bad faith, "mauvaise
foi" (Sartre 1958, 47ff.). The subject assumes an ambivalent
relationship to himself, he allows himself, so to speak, to slide into
an "intentional inattention": one doesn’t know something and
doesn’t want to know it; one doesn’t see something and doesn’t want
to see it, and in this way becomes the deceived and the deceiver in
one.
– Second, there is the possibility of taking the ambiguity of the lived
body as the starting point, that means, its shifting between remaing
tacit and becoming aware, as conceived by Plessner as well as
Merleau-Ponty. Then it becomes possible to encounter the unconscious in bodily behaviour, in day-to-day living and in the structures
of the person's lived space. This would not be an unconscious in
some unknown depths of the psyche, but unconscious in the
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horizontal dimension, so-to-speak. Body memory plays a special part
here, insofar as it turns a person’s bodily and inter-bodily
experiences into implicitly effective dispositions, which provide the
mostly unconscious basis for day-to-day living.
The latter is the course which I will take in what follows. So the question
will be: Can the unconscious be localized in the lived relationships and
conduct of a person, in the horizontal dimension of the lived body and
intercorporeality? How far can such a concept reflect elements of Freud's
unconscious? – In what follows, I first want to develop the concept of body
memory and the relational field that it constitutes, and then look for the
structures of this field where the unconscious can, as it were, take up its
abode.

Body memory
If, following Merleau-Ponty, we view the body not as the visible, touchable
and sentient physical body but first and foremost as our capacity to see,
touch, and sense, then body memory designates the totality of these bodily
dispositions as they have formed in the course of our development – in
other words, in their historical dimension. In body memory, the situations
and actions experienced in the past are, as it were, fused together without
any of them standing out individually. Through the repetition and superimposition of experiences, a habit structure has been formed: wellpracticed motion sequences, repeatedly perceived Gestalten, forms of actions and interactions have become an implicit bodily knowledge and skill.
Body memory does not take one back to the past, but conveys an implicit
effectiveness of the past in the present. This approach converges with the
results of recent memory research on the central significance of implicit
memory which is to some extent equivalent to body memory, though, as we
will see, the latter comprises much more phenomena.
The body is thus the ensemble of acquired and organically developed
predispositions and capacities to perceive, to act, but also to desire and to
communicate. Its experiences, anchored in body memory, cover the
environment like an invisible network which relates us to things and to
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other people. It is our permanent means to actualise our past and, with this,
to make ourselves feel at home in situations. It is important to note that
what is mediated and enabled by body memory is mostly forgotten in terms
of explicit memory. An example may be seen in the capacity of typewriting
which is a memory “in the fingers” unavailable for explicit knowledge
(illustration: “keyboard”).
Moreover, in the bodily experience structures, the others are always already
included, they are pre-reflectively understood in expression and intended in
desire. Before I can reflect on what I am communicating through my
gestures or speech, my body always already creates the feeling of beingwith; it expresses itself through attitude and gestures, and at the same time
reacts to the impressions of others. This "intercorporeality" (Merleau-Ponty
1964, 168) forms a superordinate, intersubjective system in which, from
childhood on, forms of bodily interaction are established and constantly reactualized. It comprises the self and the others, the conscious and the
unconscious: "I do not have to search very far for others: I find them in my
experience, lodged in the hollows that show what they see and what I fail to
see (…) We are in no way locked inside ourselves" (Merleau-Ponty 1973,
138f.).

Body memory and life space
Body memory thus forms not only an interior system restricted to the
physical body. It also constitutes a sensorimotor, emotional and interactive
field in which we, as embodied beings, constantly move and conduct
ourselves; thus, it may also be regarded as the historical dimension of the
body schema which is always already related to the environment too. What
offers itself here is the terminology of Kurt Lewin's field psychology
(1936), particularly the concept of the life space with its center in the lived
body. In order to link it with the structures of body memory, I want to give
a brief outline of this.
As I mentioned, the life space is centred around the person and the person's
body. According to Lewin, it is characterised by experienced characteristics
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such as closeness or distance, narrowness or breadth, connectedness or
separateness, attainability etc., and it is structured by physical or symbolic
boundaries which offer resistance to movement. This produces more or less
clearly bounded sectors such as the peripersonal space around one's own
body, claimed territories (property, home), the sphere of influence which
emanates from someone, but also prohibited or taboo zones. The lived
space is further permeated by felt "field forces" or "vectors", in the first
place those which attract and repel. Competing attractive or repulsive
forces in the life space lead to typical conflicts such as attraction versus
aversion, attraction versus attraction etc. They can be considered as
conflicting directions of movement or possibilities which are offered to a
person in a given situation. Moreover, the life space is characterized by
effects of „gravitation“, „radiation“, or by „curvatures of space”.
A good example of conflicting field forces and curvatures is offered by the
situation of a small child who is torn back and forth between his bond to his
mother and curiosity (cf. Stern 1991, 101). The mother is first of all the
"safe haven", the centre of gravity, so to speak, which curves the child's
experienced space in such a way that he remains in her vicinity. The space
thus acquires a gradient: the further the child moves away from the mother,
the more empty or lonely the space becomes. While it condenses again
around other, i.e. strange, people, the child rather makes a detour around
them: the space curvature near them is "negative". Little by little, the
child's exploratory drive looses his tie to his mother, so that it becomes
possible to increase the distance against the gradient – only until the bond
is stretched too much, and the child runs back to his mother in the end.
This example is also a good illustration of the fact that the respective field
structures are based on body memory, in this case, the history of the experiences the child has had in closeness and security with his mother –
attachment research has shown this in detail. From birth on, body memory
incorporates an extract of typical experiences with others, thus acquiring
dyadic patterns of interaction or “schemes of being-with” (Stern 1985), or
an “implicit relational knowing” (Stern, Lyons-Ruth 1998).
Another proverbial example of body memory lies in the saying, “A burnt
child dreads the fire” (German proverb), or "Once bitten, twice shy", which
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illustrate the negative or aversive effect of body memory, in this case, of
pain memory. A third example, finally, is given by the zones of prohibition
which restrict the child’s movements so that his spontaneous impulses
interfere with parental imperatives, namely, inasmuch these have left a
negative mark and a negative gradient on his very life space.
Consequently, the life space – depending on the respective experiences of a
person – can bear varying significances, relevances or valences. In analogy
to a physical field, "gravitational effects", invisible "curvatures" of space,
or barriers can appear which restrict or prevent spontaneous movements.
Particularly in psychopathology, we encounter various deformations of the
lived space (Fuchs 2007), as, for instance, the implicit avoidance zones of
phobic patients or the taboo zones of obsessive patients, which are based on
certain past experiences sedimented in body memory.

On the phenomenology of the unconscious
With this, I have made a brief sketch of an approach and a terminology
which permit the question of the unconscious to be put and answered in a
different way.
If we reject Freud’s idea of a topological unconscious beyond subjectivity –
a separate intra-psychic process which impacts on the experiencing subject
from outside, so to speak – then we may ask whether the unconscious
might not be considered another mode of experiencing that manifests itself
in the horizontal dimension of the lived body and the lived space. The paradigm for this would be the ambiguity of the body itself which, while seeing, always remains unseen, and of whose dispositions I often remain unaware, which in fact come to meet me from outside, namely in the form of
the attractive or repelling objects, the affordances and field structures of my
environment. Such an unconscious would then, as Merleau-Ponty writes,
"… be sought not at the bottom of ourselves, behind the back of our 'consciousness', but in front of us, as articulation of our field" (Merleau-Ponty
1968, 180). It would be the unrecognized reverse side of our experience
and conduct, or its other, hidden meaning.
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As our starting point, let us first consider the field structure of a repressed
wish. In his short story "Der Branntweinsäufer und die Berliner Glocken"
(The brandy drinker and Berlin's bells), Heinrich von Kleist recounts the
story of an alcoholic soldier who, after insistent preaching and punishment,
has resolved to become abstinent but was found drunk after only three
days. Asked how this relapse could have happened after all his good resolutions, the soldier justified himself by saying that the devil must have had
his hand in it because while walking through the town he suddenly heard
the names of various brandies in the tolling of the bells - for example
"Kümmel! Kümmel!" in the ringing of the town hall bell, "Pommeranzen,
Pommeranzen" in the ringing cathedral bell and so on. In the end, he could
not help being defeated by these insidious sounds.3
While this humorous example relates only to a wish that was not actually
repressed but merely suppressed by an act of will, it gives a fine
illustration of the indirect way in which contrary bodily impulses or drives
can get their way, namely from outside. This hidden role of the lived body
may also be grasped in Polanyi’s (1967) terms: The lived body and its
desires are the proximal component of the perceptual or affective field, and
the perceived situation is the distal component; but the proximal
component recedes from awareness in favour of the distal. We perceive the
situation through the medium of the body.
The experiential field is thus, so to speak, interspersed with a suppressed
desire which becomes crystallised finally around certain perceptions –
namely those which are sufficiently vague while offering a certain
similarity for the purpose: in Kleist’s case the various chimes. The uncertain or ambiguous is a particular place where a latent or hidden
significance can take shape. The drive or the wish that was not satisfied
breaks through circuitously and from outside so that, in principle, we can
already recognize the defence mechanism of displacement. What is actually
desired is fulfilled through something similar but less prohibited.
A comparable interference of explicit intentions and implicit directions of
meaning is also found in the various types of "Freudian slips". Freud
himself says that "…slips are the result of two different intentions which
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interfere with one another, of which one can be called the disturbed and the
other the disturbing intention" (Freud 1940a, 56). Mishearing is most like
the example of Kleist's soldier: a latently desired meaning is "interpreted"
from a similar sequence of sounds. To take another example: She asks:
“What would you like—bread and butter, or cake?”, while he unterstands:
“Bed and butter”, thus manifesting his latent sexual intention.
Similarly, with slips of the tongue, or of the pen, and with mislaying and
losing things, another intention interferes with the explicitly intended
action, so that “the right hand – literally – does not know what the left hand
is doing”. Finally, with forgetting, an originally made but unpleasant
intention is blanked out and replaced by others, for example, routine
processes. Thus, in spontaneous bodily perceptions or actions which take
place "of their own accord", the relevant latent intention wins through in
spontaneous bodily enaction – in a reversal or a chiasm which is expressed
by the prefix "mis-".
The producer of the slip can now either immediately or after some brief
thought recognise its significance and ascribe it to himself, or he finds it
"senseless", in other words, alien to himself. For example, Freud writes the
following concerning "misspeaking":
"If later we present it [the intention on which the misspeaking was based]
to the speaker, he may either acknowledge it as something familiar, so that
it was only temporarily unconscious, or he may deny it as alien to himself,
which means that it was permanently unconscious" (Freud 1940c, 77).

It is on this difference, amongst other things, that Freud bases his categorical distinction between the preconscious and the true dynamic unconscious
which is excluded or repressed from consciousness "by living forces"
(Freud 1943, 436). The defence mechanism and the corresponding resistance to the latent meaning are based on the assumption that the
inhibition and its motives are themselves excluded from consciousness.
However, the question is whether this justifies establishing a special
intrapsychic space for the dynamic unconscious. Against this, there is the
merely gradual difference between a temporary and a permanent unconscious in the Freud quotation which I cited. In both cases, after all, we
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are dealing mainly with a duplicity of intentions, to which only an
additional repressive tendency is added in the second case. But if we do not
assign the "living forces" of repression of which Freud speaks to an
intrapsychic mechanism beyond consciousness, but see them rather as
dynamic field forces, we will easily find models for them in the lived body
and life space.
The first thing that comes to mind would be the relieving posture adopted
after sustaining an injury: spontaneously one avoids putting the injured
limb at risk from dangerous objects and holds it back without having still to
think of the event. Avoidance behaviour is thus incorporated into body
memory. Moreover, I have already mentioned the zones of prohibition
which face the child and operate against its approach through negative field
forces until the child respects them automatically. We come one step closer
to the dynamic unconscious with zones or objects which are taboo. For,
unlike prohibition, the taboo has a special structure and effect in that it is
not expressly formulated but is generated by the avoidance behaviour of
others, like a negative curvature of the shared life space around what is
prohibited. Taboos are most effective when they are not declared, and the
members of the community are not even aware of them. The infringement
of taboos is not necessarily punished with open penalties, but automatically
generates feelings of shame, guilt or abhorrence in the offender, reinforced
by the contempt and the ostracising silence of the others.
In all these cases, experience and conduct are determined by negative or
"repulsive" field forces exercising their effect unconsciously since the
subject, like the "once bitten" person, has gradually extricated herself from
the possible conflict. Avoidance has become an implicit, bodily pattern of
behaviour so that what is potentially threatening in the environment is no
longer consciously experienced. Nevertheless, repelling forces do not appear to consciousness as coming from outside but, in Hegel’s terms, as “its
own otherness”. They remain co-extensive with the experiential field but as
its negative. The manifest feelings of fear, guilt or shame which arise on
stepping beyond the barriers in the life space were already latently present
before, endowing these barriers with their unpleasant affective loading.
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In the same way, in the case of a "slip", the dynamic unconscious puts up
resistance to its becoming conscious. This resistance is itself not conscious,
nor is it implicitly or preconscious, and yet on this account it is still not
altogether outside consciousness. It is rather an ambiguity or duplicity of
consciousness itself; in such a way that the subject, if she hits on the manifestation of the hidden meaning, at least has an inkling that it is asking her
a question, namely about her own otherness. The unconscious, writes Merleau-Ponty,
"… cannot be a process ‘in third person’, since it is the unconscious which
chooses what aspect of us will be admitted to official existence, which
avoids the thoughts or situation we are resisting, and which is therefore
not an un-knowledge but rather a non-recognized and unformulated
knowledge that we do not want to take up. In an approximative language,
Freud is on the point of discovering what other thinkers have more
appropriately named ambiguous perception" (Merleau-Ponty 2007, 194).

We can understand this ambiguity of consciousness with the example of
another defence mechanism, namely projection. Here the beam in one's
own eye proverbially becomes the splinter in another's eye; in other words,
one perceives in others the impulses and motives against which one has
built defences in oneself. Naturally, this perception is also ambiguous,
since the excessive zeal with which the impulses in others are disapproved
derives its energy precisely from the efforts one has to make to neutralize
one's own impulses. The blind spot in self-awareness – and here Freud is
doubtlessly right – does not result from a mere "overlooking", but from
active and emotionally charged repression. Nevertheless, this repression
remains the work and the latent effort of the subject herself, not of a
subpersonal mechanism outside her. What originally was one’s own has
been excluded and now appears in the outside as alien or repulsive, but the
alien is actually nothing else but one’s own otherness.

Trauma and reiteration
Let us now turn to another phenomenon, namely, the unconscious effect of
an emotional trauma which Merleau-Ponty sets out to interpret in his "Phe-
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nomenology of Perception". What is repressed, he writes, is generally like a
phantom limb for an amputee inasmuch as a capacity or disposition
continues in the body which is no longer congruent with the present.
Habitual and current body come into conflict with one another. In a similar
manner, repression creates an “empty space” in the current subjectivity
(Merleau-Ponty 1962, 87), for the “negative” left by an experience which
has not been dealt with interposes itself unnoticed before every new
situation and thus imprisons the traumatised person in a past which is still
present.
"…(T)his fixation does not merge into memory; it even excludes memory
in so far as … [the trauma] does not leave us but remains constantly
hidden behind our gaze instead being displayed before it. The traumatic
experience does not survive as a representation in the mode of objective
consciousness … [but] as a manner of being and with a certain degree of
generality" (ibid. 83).

This description assigns the repressed trauma not to explicit but to body
memory, which holds what is hidden "from sight" and goes on in a general
manner or "style" of existence.4 The injury or violence has penetrated the
body of the subject and has left behind a permanent sensitivity, a readiness
to defend oneself. The traumatised person becomes hypersensitive to
threatening, shaming situations similar to the trauma, even if this similarity
is not consciously recognized, and tries to circumvent them. "The
resistance is directed to a certain area of experience, a certain category, a
certain type of memory" (ibid. 194). All the same, at every step, the victim
may encounter something that reawakens the trauma in her. Often it happens that a permanent predisposition develops to react with fear and nervousness, to become alarmed every time the doorbell rings, a feeling of being followed or observed by unknown people.
An impressive description is to be found in the memoirs of the Jewish writer Aharon Appelfeld, who from his seventh to his thirteenth year of age
experienced the Second World War hiding in the woods of the Ukraine:
“More than fifty years have passed since the end of the war. I have
forgotten much, even things that were very close to me – places in
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particular, dates, and the names of people – and yet I can still sense those
days in every part of my body. Whenever it rains, it’s cold, or a fierce
wind is blowing, I am taken back to the ghetto, to the camp, or to the
forests where I spent many days. Memory, it seems, has deep roots in the
body.” – “The cells of my body apparently remember more than my mind
which is supposed to remember. For years after the war, I would walk
neither in the middle of the sidewalk nor in the middle of the road. I
always clung to the walls, always staying in the shade, and always
walking rapidly, as if I were slipping away. (…). Sometimes, just the
aroma of a certain dish, or the dampness of shoes or a sudden noise is
enough to take me back in the middle of the war (…). The war has
infiltrated my bones.” – “… the palms of one’s hands, the soles of one’s
feet, one’s back, and one’s knees remember more than memory. Had I
drawn from them, I would have been overwhelmed with what I have seen
(Appelfeld 2009, p. 50, 90, vii).

Here it is not a particular episode, but an entire segment of his life that has
left its mark on the body, more deeply and permanently, of course, than the
autobiographic memory could have done: Proprioception, touch, smell,
hearing, even certain kinds of weather can suddenly allow the past to come
to life again, and even bodily pattern of movement, such as the hunted walk
close to the wall, still imitates the behaviour of the fugitive.
The effect of the trauma on the person can thus be viewed, first, as a specific deformation of her lived space corresponding to an unconscious avoidance behaviour which he or she adopts towards the anxiety-provoking or
"repelling zones". The lived space around these zones is to a certain extent
negatively curved and prevents the free movement of life. Second, the life
space is permeated with similarities in which the trauma approaches the
traumatised person from outside, so that it is impossible to avoid it. For in
one's attitude, one's stance, and in one's perceptive predispositions, one
carries the trauma into one's world over and over again.
We may finally relate this to the psychoanalytic concept of repetition
compulsion. This concept is based on the clinical experience that patients
continue to be drawn into the same, mostly damaging behaviour or
relationship patterns even if they try to prevent this at the conscious level.
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Their lived space is so to speak "positively curved" around these regions –
in other words, these exercise an unnoticed attraction. If, for example, a
person's early experiences were characterized by abusive relationships, this
issue will determine also that person's later relationship patterns. The types
of abuse may vary, but the implicit behaviour patterns deposited in body
memory will have the effect of fulfilling her expectations and bring about
the familiar type of relationship. These unconscious enactments, as they are
called today, may also become tangible in the psychotherapeutic relation,
where Freud, of course, regarded them as a form of transference. As he
writes, we must
"… say in analysis that the analysand remembers nothing at all of what
has been forgotten and repressed, but he acts it out. He does not reproduce
it as a memory but as action, he repeats it, naturally without realizing that
he is repeating it. For example, the analysand does not say that he
remembers being defiant and incredulous towards the authority of his
parents, but he behaves in this manner towards the doctor" (Freud 1946,
129).

The unconscious pre-history of intersubjective relations is re-enacted
through the intercorporeal body memory. However, this means that the
unconscious is not a hidden chamber of the psyche any more, but is
interwoven in the life style, in the bodily conduct of a person, as a substructure which remains hidden from her personally, but becomes visible to
others because, in the final analysis, it is always implicitly directed to those
others themselves. The “blind spot” in the center of consciousness can also
be viewed as the other side of the intersubjective relationship, in which our
own being-with-others must necessarily remain hidden from us, so that this
dark side of ourselves can only be illuminated in our communication with
others. For in my world the others dwell "… in the hollows that show what
they see and what I fail to see" (Merleau-Ponty 1973, 138f.).

Conclusion
From the point of view of a phenomenology of the lived body, the unconscious is not an intrapsychic reality residing in the depths "below consciousness". Rather, it surrounds and permeates conscious life, just as in
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picture puzzles the figure hidden in the background surrounds the foreground, and just as the lived body conceals itself while functioning as a
medium of being-towards-the-world. It is an unconscious which is not
located in the vertical dimension of the psyche but rather in the horizontal
dimension of lived space, most of all lodging in the intercorporeality of
dealings with others, as the hidden or reverse side of day-to-day living. It is
an unconscious which is not to be found deep inside the individual but in
his or her relationships to others, as an unnoticed interbodily field.5
Unconscious fixations are like certain restrictions in a person's space of potentialities produced by an implicit but ever-present past which declines to
take part in the continuing progress of life. Their traces, however, are not
hidden in an inner psychic world but manifest themselves rather as "blind
spots", "empty spaces" or curvatures in the lived space: in the "slips" in
speech and action; in the relationship patterns into which a person repeatedly blunders, in the actions which are avoided without being aware of it; in
the spaces which are not entered, the opportunities offered by life which
one does not take, and even does not dare to see. Such traces may be recognised as "negatives" so to speak, in the form of inhibitions or omissions
which are characteristic of a person. They can also become symbolically or
physically present in neurotic or psychosomatic symptoms. The symptom
is to this extent neither meaningless nor a defective habit – as learning theory assumed6 – nor is its meaning to be found beyond itself, in the unconscious interior. Rather, it lies in the intercorporeal expression, in the interactive field, even if this meaning is not evident, but must be understood and
interpreted.
The unconscious is thus absence in presence, the unperceived in the perceived (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 245f.). Like a figure blanks out the ground
from which it stands out, thus consciousness, perception and language conceal their reverse side, namely the unconscious, the unperceived, and the
silence, which are always bound up with them. This reverse side, however,
does not remain fully concealed but expresses itself in reversals, chiasmatic
entanglements, in an ambiguity of consciousness: One does not know
something and does not want to know it; one does not see something and
does not want to see it – in other words, one looks past it intentionally-
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unintentionally. Consciousness is not fully transparent to itself because it
hides itself from itself.
This duplicity of consciousness corresponds to the ambiguity of the body
whose modes of appearing fluctuate between the thematic and the unthematic, between the physical (Körper) and the lived body (Leib). But it also
corresponds to the ambivalent, conflict-prone nature of our existence itself
where we, precisely as natural, embodied beings, can always confront our
own instinctive and natural side as well. This is what constitutes the contradictoriness or, to speak with Plessner (1975), the "eccentricity" of the
way we relate to ourselves, the constant conflict between spontaneity and
reflectivity, “body” and “soul”, nature and nurture, conscious and
unconscious. One could then accuse Freud that even he, for all his
scepticism, was too generous to humankind in that he tried to relieve our
consciousness of this inherent conflict by placing our opposing will in a
separate space belonging to the unconscious – thus withdrawing this will
from our own responsibility.

1

As is well known, both Husserl's "Logische Untersuchungen" and Freud's "Traumdeutung"
appeared in 1900.
2

Cf. Freud 1940b, 253.

3

Kleist 1984. – The story is also cited by Graumann (1960, 151) as an illustration of the
motivational basis of perspectivity.
4

„comme un style d’être“, in the French original (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 98).

5

"(…) the latency of psychoanalysis is an unconscious that is beneath conscious life and within
the individual, an intrapsychic reality that leads to a psychology of depth in the vertical
dimension. (…) the latency of phenomenology is an unconscious which surrounds conscious
life, an unconsciousness in the world, between us, an ontological theme that leads to a
psychology of depth in the lateral dimension" (Romanyshyn 1977).
6

"Learning theory assumes no 'unconscious' causes whatsoever but views neurotic symptoms
simply as learned habits. There is no neurosis at the bottom of the symptom, only the
symptom itself " (Eysenck & Rachmann 1972, 20).

